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Symbolic Artificial Intelligence and Numeric Artificial Neural Networks:
Towards A Resolution of the Dichotomy
Abstract
The attempt to understand intelligence entails building theories and models of brains and minds, both natural
as well as artificial. From the earliest writings of India and Greece, this has been a central problem in
philosophy. The advent of the digital computer in the 1950's made this a central concern of computer
scientists as well (Turing, 1950). The parallel development of the theory of computation (by John von
Neumann, Alan Turing, Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Charles Kleene, Markov and others) provided a new set of
tools with which to approach this problem --- through analysis, design, and evaluation of computers and
programs that exhibit aspects of intelligent behavior --- such as the ability to recognize and classify patterns; to
reason from premises to logical conclusions; and to learn from experience. In their pursuit of artificial
intelligence and mind/brain modelling, some wrote programs that they executed on serial stored---program
computers (e.g., Newell, Shaw and Simon, 1963; Feigenbaum, 1963); Others had more parallel, brain---like
networks of processors (reminiscent of today's connectionist networks) in mind and wrote more or less
precise specifications of what such a realization of their programs might look like (e.g., Rashevsky, 1960;
McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; Selfridge and Neisser, 1963; Uhr and Vossler, 1963); and a few took the middle
ground (Uhr, 1973; Holland, 1975; Minsky, 1963; Arbib, 1972; Grossberg, 1982; Klir, 1985). It is often
suggested that two major approaches have emerged --- symbolic artificial intelligence (SAI) and (numeric)
artificial neural networks (NANN or connectionist networks) and some (Norman, 1986; Schneider, 1987)
have even suggested that they are fundamentally and perhaps irreconcilably different. Indeed it is this apparent
dichotomy between the two apparently disparate approaches to modelling cognition and engineering
intelligent systems that is responsible for the current interest in computational architectures for integrating
neural and symbolic processes. This topic is the focus of several recent books (Honavar and Uhr, 1994a;
Goonatilake and Khebbal, 1994; Levine and Aparicioiv, 1994; Sun and Bookman, 1994). This raises some
important questions: What exactly are symbolic processes? What do they have to do with SAI? What exactly
are neural processes? What do they have to do with NANN? What (if anything) do SAI and NANN have in
common? How (if at all) do they differ? What exactly are computational architectures? Do SAI and NANN
paradigms need to be integrated? Assuming that the answer to the last question is yes, what are some possible
ways one can go about designing computational architectures for this task? This chapter is an attempt to
explore some of these fundamental questions in some detail. This chapter argues that the dichotomy between
SAI and NANN is more perceived than real. So our problems lie first in dispelling misinformed and wrong
notions, and second (perhaps more difficult) in developing systems that take advantage of both paradigms to
build useful theories and models of minds/brains on the one hand, and robust, versatile and adaptive
intelligent systems on the other. The first of these problems is best addressed by a critical examination of the
popular conceptions of SAI and NANN systems along with their philosophical and theoretical foundations as
well as their practical implementations; and the second by a judicious theoretical and experimental
exploration of the rich and interesting space of designs for intelligent systems that integrate concepts,
constructs, techniques and technologies drawn from not only SAI (Ginsberg, 1993; Winston, 1992) and
NANN (McClelland, Rumelhart et al., 1986; Kung, 1993; Haykin, 1994; Zeidenberg, 1989), but also other
related paradigms such as statistical and syntactic pattern recognition (Duda and Hart, 1973; Fukunaga, 1990;
Fu, 1982; Miclet, 1986), control theory (Narendra and Annaswamy, 1989) systems theory (Klir, 1969),
genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 1989; Michalewicz, 1992) and evolutionary programming
(Koza, 1992). Exploration of such designs should cover a broad range of problems in perception, knowledge
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representation and inference, robotics, language, and learning, and ultimately, integrated systems that display
what might be considered human---like general intelligence.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The attempt to understand intelligence entails building theories and models of
brains and minds, both natural as well as articial. From the earliest writings
of India and Greece, this has been a central problem in philosophy. The advent
of the digital computer in the 1950's made this a central concern of computer
scientists as well (Turing, 1950). The parallel development of the theory of
computation (by John von Neumann, Alan Turing, Emil Post, Alonzo Church,
Charles Kleene, Markov and others) provided a new set of tools with which
to approach this problem | through analysis, design, and evaluation of com-
puters and programs that exhibit aspects of intelligent behavior | such as the
ability to recognize and classify patterns; to reason from premises to logical
conclusions; and to learn from experience.
In their pursuit of articial intelligence and mind/brain modelling, some wrote
programs that they executed on serial stored-program computers (e.g., Newell,
Shaw and Simon, 1963; Feigenbaum, 1963); Others had more parallel, brain-like
networks of processors (reminiscent of today's connectionist networks) in mind
and wrote more or less precise specications of what such a realization of their
programs might look like (e.g., Rashevsky, 1960; McCulloch and Pitts, 1943;
Selfridge and Neisser, 1963; Uhr and Vossler, 1963); and a few took the middle
ground (Uhr, 1973; Holland, 1975; Minsky, 1963; Arbib, 1972; Grossberg, 1982;
Klir, 1985).
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It is often suggested that two major approaches have emerged | symbolic
articial intelligence (SAI) and (numeric) articial neural networks (NANN
or connectionist networks) and some (Norman, 1986; Schneider, 1987) have
even suggested that they are fundamentally and perhaps irreconcilably dier-
ent. Indeed it is this apparent dichotomy between the two apparently dis-
parate approaches to modelling cognition and engineering intelligent systems
that is responsible for the current interest in computational architectures for
integrating neural and symbolic processes. This topic is the focus of several re-
cent books (Honavar and Uhr, 1994a; Goonatilake and Khebbal, 1994; Levine
and Aparicioiv, 1994; Sun and Bookman, 1994). This raises some important
questions: What exactly are symbolic processes? What do they have to do
with SAI? What exactly are neural processes? What do they have to do with
NANN? What (if anything) do SAI and NANN have in common? How (if at
all) do they dier? What exactly are computational architectures? Do SAI and
NANN paradigms need to be integrated? Assuming that the answer to the last
question is yes, what are some possible ways one can go about designing com-
putational architectures for this task? This chapter is an attempt to explore
some of these fundamental questions in some detail.
This chapter argues that the dichotomy between SAI and NANN is more per-
ceived than real. So our problems lie rst in dispelling misinformed and wrong
notions, and second (perhaps more dicult) in developing systems that take ad-
vantage of both paradigms to build useful theories and models of minds/brains
on the one hand, and robust, versatile and adaptive intelligent systems on the
other. The rst of these problems is best addressed by a critical examination of
the popular conceptions of SAI and NANN systems along with their philosoph-
ical and theoretical foundations as well as their practical implementations; and
the second by a judicious theoretical and experimental exploration of the rich
and interesting space of designs for intelligent systems that integrate concepts,
constructs, techniques and technologies drawn from not only SAI (Ginsberg,
1993; Winston, 1992) and NANN (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Kung,
1993; Haykin, 1994; Zeidenberg, 1989), but also other related paradigms such
as statistical and syntactic pattern recognition (Duda and Hart, 1973; Fuku-
naga, 1990; Fu, 1982; Miclet, 1986)), control theory (Narendra and Annaswamy,
1989) systems theory (Klir, 1969), genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975; Goldberg,
1989; Michalewicz, 1992) and evolutionary programming (Koza, 1992). Explo-
ration of such designs should cover a broad range of problems in perception,
knowledge representation and inference, robotics, language, and learning, and
ultimately, integrated systems that display what might be considered human-
like general intelligence.
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2 SHARED FOUNDATIONS OF SAI AND
NANN
This section makes clear that the fundamental philosophical assumptions and
scientic hypotheses that have shaped both SAI and NANN research are iden-
tical. The shared foundations of SAI and NANN guarantee that there can
be no fundamental incompatibility between the two paradigms for engineering
intelligent systems or for modelling minds/brains.
2.1 SAI and NANN Share the Same Working
Hypotheses
The fundamental working hypothesis that has guided most of the research in
articial intelligence as well as the information-processing school of psychology
is rather simply stated: Cognition, or thought processes can, at some level,
be modelled by computation. The philosophical roots of this hypothesis can
be traced at least as far back as the attempts of Helmholtz, Leibnitz and
Boole to explain thought processes in terms of mechanical (or in modern terms,
algorithmic or computational) processes. This has led to the functional view
of intelligence which is shared explicitly or implicitly by almost all of the work
in SAI as well as NANN. Newell's physical symbol system hypothesis (Newell,
1980), Fodor's language of thought (Fodor, 1976), Minsky's society of mind
(Minsky, 1986), Holland's classier systems (Holland, 1986), and most neural
network models (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Kung, 1993; Haykin, 1994;
Zeidenberg, 1989) are all specic examples of this functional view. In this
view, intelligence can be characterized abstractly as a functional capability
independent of any commitments as to the specic physical substrates that
support the functions in question.
The primary means of describing the behavior of intelligent systems (be they
natural or articial) within the SAI paradigm is in terms of their having knowl-
edge and behaving in light of that knowledge. This is the so-called knowledge-
level description (Newell, 1990). But it is important to remember that de-
scriptions at the knowledge-level represent just one of the many alternatives
available. The choice of what description to use in modelling intelligence, as in
science in general, must be based on pragmatic considerations as determined by
aspects of the phenomena being modelled and the sorts of explanations being
sought. Satisfactory accounts of system behavior often make use of multiple
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levels of description along with the necessary means of mapping descriptions
at one level into descriptions at adjacent levels.
Perhaps not so obvious is the fact that exactly the same functional view of
intelligence is at the heart of current approaches to mimic intelligent behav-
ior within the NANN paradigm, as well as the attempts to understand brain
function using the techniques of computational neuroscience and neural mod-
elling. The earliest work on neural networks by Rashevsky (1960), McCulloch
and Pitts (1943) and Rosenblatt (1962)nociteros62 | from which many of
today's NANN models are derived | illustrates this point rather well. So
does the emphasis on computational models in the recent book on this topic
by Patricia Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski (1992) suggestively titled The
Computational Brain (This is not to suggest that brain modelling can ignore
the particular biological substrates that realize the computations in question
but just that the computational characterization of what the brains do pro-
vides a useful class of explanations and predictions of mental phenomena). It
is important to note that NANN models or theories of intelligence are stated
in terms of abstract computational mechanisms just as their SAI counterparts.
The dierences (if any) from SAI are primarily in terms of the (often unstated)
preference for functional descriptions of intelligent systems at a dierent level
of detail using a dierent set of primitives.
Some have (somewhat misleadingly) used the term neural level to refer to such
descriptions. Today's NANN models are almost certainly grossly oversimplied
caricatures of biological brains (Shepherd, 1989; 1990). It is far from clear that
NANN are more suited to modelling brains any more than SAI; Descriptions in
terms of rules, tokens, and automata (typically associated with SAI systems)
oer extremely useful descriptions of biological neural circuits at the cellular
and molecular levels (Cooper, 1990). (More on this later).
It should be clear from the discussion above that both SAI and NANN paradigms
essentially oer two dierent description languages for describing systems in
general and intelligent systems | minds/brains (be they natural or articial)
| in particular. As pointed out by Chandrasekaran and Josephson (1994), the
commitment of most SAI researchers to biology in describing intelligence does
not typically go beyond the knowledge level. Although perhaps not as obvi-
ous is the fact that an analogous situation holds for NANN models. NANN
researchers pick out some interesting or relevant aspects of biological phenom-
ena, and then proceed to formulate an abstract functional model (using abstract
models of neurons) for the selected aspects of the phenomena chosen. The ab-
stract descriptions in both cases are usually stated in suciently general lan-
guages. One thing we know for certain is that such languages are all equivalent
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(see below). This provides absolute assurance that particular physical imple-
mentations of systems exhibiting mind/brain-like behavior can be described
using the language of SAI or NANN irrespective of the physical medium (bio-
logical or silicon or some other) that is used in such an implementation. And
the choice of the language should (as it usually is, in science in general) be
dictated by pragmatic considerations.
2.2 SAI and NANN Rely on Equivalent
Models of Computation
Turing was among the rst to formalize the common-sense notion of compu-
tation in terms of execution of what he called an eective procedure or an
algorithm. In the process, he invented a hypothetical computer | the Turing
machine. The behavior of the Turing machine is governed by an algorithm
which is realized in terms of a program or a nite sequence of instructions.
Turing also showed that there exists a universal Turing machine (essentially a
general purpose stored program computer with potentially innite memory)|
one that can compute anything that any other Turing machine could possibly
compute | given the necessary program as well as the data and a means for
interpreting its programs. Several alternative models of computation were de-
veloped around the same time including lambda calculus of Church and Rosser,
Post productions, Markov algorithms, Petri nets, and McCulloch-Pitts neural
networks. However, all of these models (given potentially innite memory) were
proved exactly equivalent to the Turing Machine. That is, any computation
that can be described by a nite program can be programmed in any general
purpose language or on any Turing-equivalent computer (Cohen, 1986). (How-
ever, a program for the same computation may be much more compact when
written in one language than in some other; or it may execute much faster on
one computer than some other). But the provable equivalence of all general
purpose computers and languages assures us that any computation | be it
numeric or symbolic | can be realized, in principle, by both SAI as well as
NANN systems.
Given the reliance of both SAI and NANN on equivalent formal models of
computation, the questions of interest have to do with the identication of
particular subsets of Turing-computable functions that model various aspects
of intelligent behavior given the various design and performance constraints
imposed by the physical implementation media at our disposal.
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3 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
REVISITED
Knowledge representation and inference are perhaps among the most central
research issues in the integration of SAI and NANN paradigms for modelling
cognitive phenomena and engineering intelligent systems. This is evident from
the fact that almost all the recent books on the integration of SAI and NANN
paradigms (Honavar and Uhr, 1994a; Levine and Aparicioiv, 1994; Sun and
Bookman, 1994) have devoted several chapters to this topic. It is therefore
worth clarifying some basic issues about knowledge representation.
It is generally accepted in articial intelligence and cognitive science that knowl-
edge has to be represented in some form in order for it to be used. This is free
of any commitment as to how a particular piece of knowledge is internally rep-
resented. However, implicit in this view is a commitment to use some language
(e.g., rst order logic, production rules, lambda calculus or LISP) to express
and manipulate knowledge. Expressions in any such language can be syntacti-
cally transformed into any other suciently expressive language | this follows
from the universality of the Turing framework. This is tantamount to saying
that systems that use knowledge are simultaneously describable at multiple
levels of description. And systems (such as living brains or robots) that exist
in the physical world would have physical descriptions | just as the behavior
of a computer can be described at an abstract level in terms of data structures
and programs, or in terms of machine language operations that are carried out
(thereby making the function of the hardware more transparent) or in terms of
the laws of physics that describe the behavior of the physical medium which is
used to construct the hardware.
Note that this view is entirely consistent with that of Churchland and others
(Churchland, 1986; Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992) who have advocated the
search for explanations of cognition at multiple levels. It is also important to
not lose sight of the fact that such a system is embedded within an external
environment with which it interacts in a closed loop fashion through sensors
and eectors and its body of knowledge is about its environment, its goals, its
actions. This is the essence of grounding (see below).
3.1 Nature of Knowledge Representation
Given the central role played by knowledge representation in functional ap-
proaches to understanding and engineering intelligence, the nature of represen-
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tation is among one the most fundamental questions in articial intelligence
and cognitive science. Some insight into this question can be obtained by con-
sidering a concrete example. A common way to represent knowledge (at least
in SAI) is with logic (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987). It is worth emphasizing
that logic is not the knowledge itself; it is simply a way of representing knowl-
edge. (However, logic can be viewed as a form of meta-level knowledge about
how to represent and reason with knowledge.) What logic enables us to do
is represent the knowledge possessed by an agent using a nite set of logical
expressions plus a process (namely, the inference rules of logic) for generating
a (potentially unlimited) set of other logical expressions that are part of the
agent's knowledge. Thus if we represented an agent's knowledge in the form
of expressions a and b, and if a ^ b j= c, the agent has (implicit) knowledge
of c even though c was not part of the (explicit) representation. In fact, rst
order logic is universal in that it is powerful enough to represent essentially
any knowledge that can be captured by a formal system. However, for certain
types of knowledge to be used for certain purposes (e.g., knowledge of the sort
that is captured by maps of some geographical region or a city), rst order logic
representation may be awkward, indirect, or overly verbose.
If on the other hand, we were to choose a dierent way of representing knowl-
edge of an agent, one which did not permit any logical deduction, then the
agent's knowledge could be limited to those expressions that were explicitly
included in the representation. Such a representation is in essence, simply a
lookup table for the expressions in question. Thus, (for lack of a better term),
the knowledge content of a representation may be limited by restricting either
the inferences allowed, the form of the expressions that may be included (that is,
limiting the expressive power), or both. Indeed, it is often necessary to impose
such limits on the power of representation in order to make their use compu-
tationally feasible (perhaps at the expense of logical soundness, completeness,
or both).
In order for any system to serve the role of a representation (as used in most
articial intelligence and cognitive science theories) it must include: an encod-
ing process that maps the physical state of the external environment into an
internal state; processes that map transformations of the physical state of the
external environment into appropriate (internal) transformations of the inter-
nal state; a decoding process that maps an internal state into a physical state of
the external environment | all subject to the constraint that the result of de-
coding the result of application of internal transformations of an internal state
(obtained from encoding a physical state of the environment) is the same as the
result of directly transforming the physical state of the external environment.
(This is perhaps a stronger requirement than is necessary | most likely inu-
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enced by the emphasis on logic. It is easy to see several ways of relaxing this
constraint | by allowing the correspondence to be only approximate instead of
exact, or attainable only with a certain probability. It must also be mentioned
that not everyone agrees with this view of representation through encoding; See
Bickhard, 1993 for a dissenting view). In short, representations are caricatures
of selected aspects of an agent's environment that are operationally useful to
the agent. Thus, certain mental operations on the representation can be used
to predict the consequences of performing corresponding physical actions on
the environment in which the agent operates.
Note that the internal transformations may be performed using LISP programs
or production systems of SAI or by a suitably structured NANN. (Note however
that the encoding and decoding processes are not purely symbolic because they
have to deal with transduction or grounding. Also worth noting is the fact that
most systems, be they SAI or NANN only simulate transduction and hence
may lack grounding).
Newell (1990) proposes an additional requirement for representations | namely
that the application of encoding (sensing), internal transformations, and decod-
ing (acting) must be executable on demand to the extent required to serve the
purposes of the organism (which could be viewed essentially as the sensed in-
ternal environment of needs, drives, and emotions).
3.2 Where Do The Representations Come
From?
Representations may be discovered by organisms (or evolution) by identifying
the right medium of encoders (transducers) and decoders (eectors) and the
right dynamics for the transformations for specic tasks. This would lead to
a large number of task-specic analogical representations. Indeed, strong evi-
dence for such analogical representations are can be found in living brains: the
retinotopic maps in the visual cortex and the somatotopic maps of the sensory-
motor cortex provide good examples of analogical representations (Kandell and
Schwartz, 1985).
Alternatively, or in addition, a set of encoders and decoders may be used in
conjunction with the ability to compose whatever sequence of transformations
that may be necessary to form a representation. Most SAI systems take this
route to the design of representations | by using a suciently general language
(e.g., LISP) that allows the composition of whatever functions that may be
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necessary to satisfy the appropriate representation laws. Most NANN systems
take the same route as well | they just happen to use a dierent language
with a dierent set of primitives for composing the necessary transformations.
Irrespective of the approach chosen, the discovery of adequately powerful, ef-
cient, and robust representations for any non-trivial set of tasks is still a
largely unsolved problem. This is where learning and evolutionary processes
play a major role. They must build the representations that perception and
cognition utilize. One of the most informative characterizations of learning to
date is in terms of storage of results of inference in a form that is suitable for
use in the future (Michalski, 1993). Learning can clearly provide an avenue for
the discovery of the necessary compositions of transformations which is a ma-
jor aspect of representation. However, note that both SAI and NANN systems
presuppose the existence of some representation before they can discover other
useful representations. (Therefore it appears that representations cannot come
into existence without the existence of physical transducers and eectors that
connect such systems with the physical world, leading to the grounding prob-
lem | see below). This makes the initial representation or encoding extremely
important. If it is not properly chosen (by the designer of the system or by
evolution), it places additional (and perhaps insurmountable) burdens on the
learning mechanisms (e.g., if the initial representation failed to capture spatial
or temporal relations at a level of detail that is necessary for dealing with the
problem domain).
It is far from clear that every task-specic representation ever used by the
system must be learned. Representations may be constructed as necessary to
solve specic problems and then discarded. Alternatively, some basic (learned
or evolved) representations may be adapted in real time for solving specic
problems. This is an important aspect of the schema-based approach to mod-
elling intelligence proposed by Arbib (1994).
As already pointed out, living brains appear to provide a rich panoply of rep-
resentations | including analogical and iconic representations in the form of
serial-parallel networks of topography-preserving projections (Kuer, Nicholls,
and Martin, 1984; Zeki and Shipp, 1988; Uhr, 1986; Honavar, 1989; Honavar
and Uhr, 1989a; 1989b) in the visual, auditory and motor cortices. Such repre-
sentations have been largely ignored in today's SAI as well as NANN models.
They may very well be among the essential representations grounded in the
environment that form the foundation of a much larger representational edice
that is needed for human-like general intelligence.
10 Chapter 12
In short, SAI and NANN systems often dier in terms of the preferred form of
knowledge representation used although any knowledge that can be represented
in one can also be represented (albeit not as eciently, robustly or elegantly)
in the other. The challenge for engineers and cognitive modellers is to choose
the right mix of SAI and NANN (and whatever other possibilities that exist)
to meet the needs of the problem at hand.
4 A CLOSER LOOK AT SAI AND NANN
Given the shared philosophical and scientic roots that SAI and NANN have in
common, why the great fuss about their integration? Answering this question
entails taking a closer look at some prototypical SAI and NANN systems fol-
lowed by a critical examination of what are generally considered their dening
characteristics and much-touted advantages and disadvantages. This examina-
tion demonstrates that despite assertions by some to the contrary, the dier-
ences between them are less than what they might seem at rst glance; and
to the extent they dier, such dierences are far from being in any reasonable
sense of the term, fundamental; and that the purported weaknesses of each
can potentially be overcome through a judicious integration of techniques and
tools selected from the other (Honavar, 1990; Honavar and Uhr, 1990a; Uhr
and Honavar, 1994; Honavar and Uhr, 1994; Uhr, 1990; Boden, 1994).
4.1 Problem Solving as State Space Search
State Space Search in SAI Systems
The prototypical SAI models are more or less direct descendents of the von
Neumann stored program model of computation. The essential components of
such a model are: a storage for programs (instructions for processing data),
a processor for interpretation and execution of the program; and a (transient)
working memory for receiving inputs, and holding intermediate results of pro-
cessing. Learning programs have additional mechanisms for self-modication
(i.e., the modication of the set of programs that they use).
The dominant paradigm for problem solving in SAI is state space search (Win-
ston, 1992; Ginsberg, 1993). States represent snap-shots of the problem at
various stages of its solution. Operators enable transforming one state into
another. Typically, the states are represented using structures of symbols (e.g.,
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lists). Operators transform one symbol structure (e.g., list, or a set of logical
expressions) into another. The system's task is to nd a path between two
specied states in the state-space (e.g., the initial state and a specied goal,
the puzzle and its solution, the axioms and a theorem to be proved, etc.).
In almost any non-trivial problem, a blind exhaustive search for a path will
be impossibly slow, and there will be no known algorithm or a procedure for
directly computing that path without resorting to search. As a result, much
work in SAI has focused on the study of eective heuristic search procedures
(Pearl, 1984). For example, SAI systems handle games like chess as follows:
The initial board is established as the given, and a procedure is coded to com-
pute whether a win-state has been reached. In addition, procedures are coded
to execute legal moves and (usually) to compute heuristic assessments of the
promise of each possible move, and to combine the separate heuristic assess-
ments into an overall value that will be used to choose the next move. Finally,
all these are put into a total structure that applies the appropriate heuristics,
combines their results and evaluates alternative moves, and actually makes a
move, then waits for and senses the opponent's moves, uses it to update the
board (probably checking that it is indeed a legal move), and loops back to
make its own next move. (For simplicity the look-ahead with minimax that
most game-players use has been ignored, but that is essentially more of the
same.)
Knowledge-Guided Search
Search in general can be guided by the knowledge that is at the disposal of the
problem solver. If the system is highly specialized, the necessary knowledge
is usually built into the search procedure (in the form of criteria for choosing
among alternative paths, heuristic functions to be used, etc.). However, general
purpose problem solvers also need to be able to retrieve problem-specic and
perhaps even situation-specic knowledge to be used to guide the search during
problem-solving. Indeed, such retrieval might itself entail search (albeit in a
dierent space). Ecient, and exible representations of such knowledge as
well as mechanisms for their retrieval as needed during problem solving are,
(although typically overlooked because most current AI systems are designed
for very specialized, narrowly dened tasks), extremely important. This is an
area where NANN or other implementations of content addressed memories
and indexing schemes are especially worth exploring.
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State Space Search in NANN Systems
The NANN system (a network of relatively simple processing elements, neu-
rons, or nodes) is typically presented with an input pattern or initialized in a
given starting state encoded in the form of a state vector each of whose ele-
ments corresponds to the state of a neuron in the network). It is designed or
trained to output the correct response to each input pattern it receives (perhaps
after undergoing a series of state updates determined by the rules governing its
dynamic behavior). The input-output behavior of the network is a function of
the network architecture, the functions computed by the individual nodes and
parameters such as the weights.
For example, the solution of an optimization problem (traditionally solved using
search) can be formulated as a problem of arriving at a state of a suitably de-
signed network that corresponds to one of minimumenergy (which is dened to
correspond in some natural way to the optimality of the solution being sought).
For an example of such an approach to theorem-proving, see (Pinkas, 1994).
Ideally, the network dynamics are set up so as to accomplish this without ad-
ditional explicit control. However, in practice, state updates in NANN systems
are often controlled in a manner that is not much dierent from explicit control
(as in sequential update of neurons in Hopeld networks (Hopeld, 1982) where
only one neuron is allowed to change its state on any update cycle) to guaran-
tee certain desired emergent behaviors). Indeed, a range of cognitive tasks do
require selective processing of information that often necessitates the use of a
variety of (albeit exible and distributed) networks of controls that is presently
lacking in most NANN models (Honavar and Uhr, 1990b). Many such control
structures and processes are suggested by an examination of computers, brains,
immune systems, and evolutionary processes.
In short, in both SAI and NANN systems, problem-solving involves state-space
search; and althoughmost current implementations tend to fall at one end of the
spectrum or the other, it should be clear that there exists a space of designs that
can use a mix of dierent state representations and processing methods. The
choice of a particular design for a particular class of problems should primarily
be governed by performance, cost, and reliability considerations for articial
intelligence applications and psychological and neurobiological plausibility for
cognitive modelling.
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4.2 Symbols, Symbol Structures, Symbolic
Processes
Symbols
Knowledge representation as described earlier, generally implies the use of sym-
bols at some level. The standard notion of a symbol is that it stands for some-
thing and when a symbol token appears within a symbolic expression carries
the interpretation that the symbol stands for something within the context
that is specied by its place in the expression. In general, a symbol serves as
a surrogate for a body of knowledge that may need to be accessed and used
in processing the symbol. And ultimately, this knowledge includes semantics
or meaning of the symbol in the context in which it appears, including that
provided by the direct or indirect grounding of the symbol structure in the
external environment (Harnad, 1990).
Symbolic Processes
Symbolic processes are essentially transformations that operate on symbol
structures to produce other symbol structures. Memory holds symbol struc-
tures that contain symbol tokens that can be modied by such processes. This
memory can take several forms based on the time scales at which such modi-
cations are allowed. Some symbol structures might have the property of de-
termining choice and the order of application of transformations to be applied
on other symbol structures. These are essentially the programs. Programs
when executed | typically through the conventional process of compilation
and interpretation and eventually | when they operate on symbols that are
linked through grounding to particular eectors | produce behavior. Work-
ing memory holds symbol structures as they are being processed. Long-term
memory, generally speaking, is the repository of programs and can be changed
by addition, deletion, or modication of symbol structures that it holds.
Such a system can compute any Turing-computable function provided it has
suciently large memory and its primitive set of transformations are adequate
for the composition of arbitrarily symbol structures (programs) and the in-
terpreter is capable of interpreting any possible symbol structure. This also
means that any particular set of symbolic processes can be carried out by an
NANN | provided it has potentially innite memory, or nds a way to use its
transducers and eectors to use the external physical environment to serve as
its memory).
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Knowledge in SAI systems is typically embedded in complex symbol structures
such as lists (Norvig, 1992), logical databases (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987),
semantic networks (Quillian, 1968), frames (Minsky, 1975), schemas (Arbib,
1972; 1994), and manipulated by (often serial) procedures or inferences (e.g.,
list processing, application of production rules (Waterman, 1985), or execution
of logic programs (Kowalski, 1977) carried out by a central processor that
accesses and changes data in memory using addresses and indices.
It is often claimed that the NANN systems predominantly perform numeric
processing in contrast to SAI systems which manipulate symbol structures.
Symbolic Processes in NANN systems
As already pointed out, NANN systems represent problem states using (typ-
ically binary) state vectors which are manipulated in a network of processors
using (typically) numeric operations (e.g., weighted sums and thresholds). It is
not hard to see that the numeric state vectors and transformations employed
in such networks play an essential symbolic role although the rules of transfor-
mation may now be an emergent property of a large number of nodes acting
in concert. In short, the formal equivalence of the various computational mod-
els guarantees that NANN can support arbitrary symbolic processes. It is not
therefore surprising that several alternative mechanisms for variable binding
and logical reasoning using NANN have been discovered in recent years. Some
of these require explicit use of symbols (Shastri and Ajjanagadde, 1989); oth-
ers resort to quasi-symbols that have some properties of symbols while not
being actually symbols in their true sense (Pollack, 1990; Maclennan, 1994);
still others use pattern vectors to encode symbols (Dolan and Smolensky, 1989;
Smolensky, 1990; Sun, 1994a; Chen and Honavar, 1994). The latter approach
to symbol processing is often said to use sub-symbolic encoding of a symbol as
a pattern vectors each of whose components is insucient in and of itself to
identify the symbol in question (see the discussion on distributed representa-
tions below). In any case, most, if not all, of these proposals are implemented
and simulated on general purpose digital computers, so none of the functions
that they compute are outside the Turing framework.
4.3 Numeric Processing
Numeric processing, as the name suggests, involves computations with num-
bers. On the surface it appears that most NANN perform essentially numeric
processing. After all, the formal neuron of McCulloch and Pitts computes
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weighted sum of its numeric inputs. And the neurons in most NANN models
perform similar numerical computations. On the other hand, SAI systems pre-
dominantly compute functions over structures of symbols. But numbers are in
fact symbols for quantities; and any computable function over numbers can be
computed by symbolic processes. In fact, general purpose digital computers
have been performing both symbolic as well as numeric processing ever since
they were invented.
4.4 Analog Processing
It is often claimed that NANN perform analog computation. Analog computa-
tion generally implies the use of dynamical systems describable using continuous
dierential equations. They operate in continuous time, generally with physical
entities such as voltages, currents, which serve as physical analogs of the quan-
tities of interest. Thus soap bubbles, servomechanisms, and cell membranes
can all be regarded as analog computers (Rajaraman, 1981).
Whether physically realizable systems are truly analog or whether analog sys-
tem is simply a mathematical idealization of (extremely ne-grained) discrete
system is a question that borders on the philosophical (e.g., are matter, time
and space continuous or discrete?). However, some things are fairly clear. Most
NANN are simulated on digital computers and compute in discrete steps and
hence are clearly not analog. The few NANN models can be regarded as analog
devices | e.g., the analog VLSI circuits designed and built by Carver Mead
and colleagues (Mead, 1989) | are incapable of discrete symbolic computations
(because of their inability to make all-or-none or discrete choices) (Maclennan,
1994) although they can approximate such computations. (For example, the
stable states or attractors of such systems can be interpreted as identiable
discrete states).
Analog systems can be, and often are simulated on digital computers at the
desired level of precision. However, this might involve a time-consuming itera-
tive calculation to produce a result that could potentially be obtained almost
instantaneously (and transduced using appropriate transducers) given the right
analog device. Thus analog processing appears to be potentially quite useful
in many applications (especially those that involve perceptual and motor be-
havior). It is possible that evolution has equipped living systems with just the
right repertoire of analog devices that help them process information in this
fashion. However, it is somewhat misleading to call such processing computa-
tion (in the sense dened by Turing) because it lacks the discrete combinatorial
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structure that is characteristic of all Turing-equivalent models of computation
(Maclennan, 1994).
Whether analog processes play a fundamental role (beyond being part of ground-
ing of representations) in intelligent systems remains very much an open ques-
tion. It is also worth pointing out that digital computers can, and in fact do,
make use of essentially analog devices such as transistors but they use only a
few discrete states to support computation (in other words, the actual ana-
log value is irrelevant so long as it lies withing a range that is distinguishable
from some other range). And when embedded in physical environments, both
SAI and NANN systems do encounter analog processes through sensors and
eectors.
4.5 Compositionality and Systematicity of
Representation
It has been argued by many e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988) that composition-
ality and systematicity (structure sensitivity) of representation are essential for
explaining mind. In their view, NANN are inadequate models of mind because
NANN representations lack these essential properties. Compositionality is the
property that demands that representations must possess an internal syntactic
structure as a consequence of a particular method for composing complex sym-
bol structures from simpler components. Systematicity requires the existence
of processes that are sensitive to the syntactic structure. As argued by Sharkey
and Jackson (1994), lack of compositionality is demonstrably true only for a
limited class of NANN representations; and compositionality and systematic-
ity in and of themselves are inadequate to account for cognition (primarily for
lack of grounding or semantics). Van Gelder and Port (1994) have shown that
several forms of compositionality can be found in NANN representations.
4.6 Grounding and Semantics
Many in the articial intelligence and cognitive science research community
agree on the need for grounding of symbolic representations through sensory
(e.g., visual, auditory, tactile) transducers and motor eectors in the external
environment on the one hand and the internal environment of needs, drives, and
emotions of the organism (or robot) in order for such representations (which
are otherwise devoid of any intrinsic meaning to the organism or robot) to be-
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come imbued with meaning or semantics (Harnad, 1990). Some have argued
that NANN systems provide the necessary apparatus for grounding (Harnad,
Hanson, and Lubin, 1994). It is important to realize that NANN as computa-
tional models do not provide physical grounding (as opposed to grounding in a
simulated world of virtual reality) for representations any more than their SAI
counterparts. It is only the physical systems with their physical substrate on
which the representations reside that are capable of providing such grounding
in physical reality when equipped with the necessary transducers and eectors.
This is true irrespective of whether the system in question is a prototypical SAI
system, or a prototypical NANN system, or a hybrid or integrated system.
4.7 Serial versus Parallel Processing
As pointed out earlier, most of today's SAI systems are serial programs that are
executed on serial von Neumann computers. However, serial symbol manipula-
tion is more an artifact of most current implementations of SAI systems than
a necessary property of SAI. In parallel and distributed computers, memory
is often locally available to the processors and even can be almost eliminated
in data ow machines which model functional or applicative programs where
data is transformed as it ows through processors or functions. Search in SAI
systems can be, and often is, parallelized by mapping the search algorithm
onto a suitable network of computers (Uhr, 1984; 1987; Hewitt, 1977; Hillis,
1985) with varying degrees of centralized or distributed control. Many search
problems that arise in applications such as temporal reasoning, resource allo-
cation, scheduling, vision, language understanding and logic programming can
be formulated as constraint satisfaction problems which often lend themselves
to solution using a mix of serial and parallel processing (Tsang, 1993).
Similarly, SAI systems using production rules can be made parallel by enabling
many rules to be matched simultaneously in a data ow fashion (as in RETE
pattern matching networks (Forgy, 1982)). Multiple matched rules may be
allowed to re and change the working memory in parallel as in parallel pro-
duction systems (Uhr, 1979) and classier systems (Holland, 1975) | so long as
whenever two or more rules demand conicting actions, arbitration mechanisms
are provided to choose among the alternatives or resolve such conicts at the
sensory-motor interface. Such arbitration mechanisms can themselves be re-
alized using serial, parallel (e.g., winner-take-all mechanism), or serial-parallel
(e.g., pyramid-like hierarchies of decision mechanisms) networks of processes.
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NANN systems with their potential for massive ne-grained parallelism of com-
putation oer a natural and attractive framework for the development of highly
parallel architectures and algorithms for problem solving and inference. Such
systems are considered necessary by many researchers (Uhr, 1980; Feldman
and Ballard, 1982) for tasks such as real-time perception. But SAI systems
doing symbolic inference can be, and often are, parallelized, and certain in-
herently sequential tasks need to be executed serially. On any given class of
problems, the choice of decomposition of the computations to be performed
into a parallel-serial network of processes and their mapping onto a particular
network of processors has to be made taking the cost and performance tradeos
into consideration.
4.8 Knowledge Engineering Versus
Knowledge Acquisition Through Learning
The emphasis in some SAI systems (especially the so-called knowledge-based
expert systems (Waterman, 1985)) on knowledge engineering has led some to
claim that SAI systems are, unlike their NANN counterparts, incapable of
learning from experience. This is clearly absurd as even a cursory look at the
current research in machine learning (Shavlik and Dietterich, 1990; Buchanan
and Wilkins, 1993) and much early work in pattern recognition (Uhr, 1973; Fu,
1982; Miclet, 1986) shows. Research in SAI and closely related systems indeed
have provided a wide range of techniques for deductive (analytical) and induc-
tive (synthetic) learning. Learning by acquisition and modication of symbol
structures almost certainly plays a major role in knowledge acquisition in hu-
mans who learn and communicate in a wide variety of natural languages (e.g.,
English) as well as articial ones (e.g., formal logic, programming languages).
While NANN systems with their micro-modular architecture oer a range of
interesting possibilities for learning, for the most part, only the simplest param-
eter or weight modication algorithms have been explored to date (McClelland
and Rumelhart, 1986 et almr86; Kung, 1993; Haykin, 1993). In fact, learning
by weight modication alone appears to be inadequate in and of itself to model
rapid and irreversible learning that is observed in many animals. Algorithms
that modify networks through structural changes that involve the recruitment
of neurons (Greenough and Bailey, 1988; Honavar, 1989; 1990; Honavar and
Uhr, 1989a; 1989b; 1993; Kung, 1993; Grossberg, 1980) appear promising in
this regard.
A detailed discussion of learning is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suces it
to point out that most forms of learning can be understood and implemented in
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terms of structures and processes for representing and reasoning with knowledge
(broadly interpreted) and for memorizing the results of such inference in a form
that lends itself to retrieval and use at a later time (Michalski, 1993). Thus
any NANN or SAI or some hybrid architecture that is capable of performing
inference and has memory for storing the results of inference for retrieval and
use on demand can be equipped with the ability to learn. The interested reader
is referred to (Honavar, 1994) for a detailed discussion of systems that learn
using multiple strategies and representations. Additional examples of systems
that combine NANN and SAI approaches to learning can be found in (Uhr,
1973; Holland, 1975; Honavar, 1992; 1994; Honavar and Uhr, 1993; Lacher and
Nguyen, 1994; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994; Shavlik, 1994; Goldfarb and
Nigam, 1994; Booker, Riolo, and Holland, 1994). In short, SAI systems oer
powerful mechanisms for manipulation of highly expressive structured symbolic
representations while NANN oer the potential for robustness, and the ability
to ne-tune their use as a function of experience (primarily due to the use of
tunable numeric weights and statistics).
4.9 Associative as Opposed to Address-Based
Storage and Recall
An often cited distinction between SAI and NANN systems is that the latter em-
ploy associative (i.e., content-addressable) as opposed to the address-and-index
based storage and recall of patterns in memory typically used by the former.
This is a misconception for several reasons: Address-and-index based memory
storage and retrieval can be used to simulate content-addressable memory and
vice versa and therefore unless one had access to the detailed internal design
operation of such systems, their behavior can be indistinguishable from each
other. Many SAI systems conventional computers use associative memories in
some form or another (e.g., hierarchical cache memories). While associative re-
call may be better for certain tasks, address (or location-based) recall may be
more appropriate for others. Indeed, many computational problems that arise
in symbolic inference (pattern matching and unication in rule-based produc-
tion systems or logic programming) can take advantage of associative memories
for ecient processing (Chen and Honavar, 1994).
In prototypical NANN models, associative recall is based on some relatively
simple measure of proximity or closeness (usually measured by Hamming dis-
tance in the case of binary patterns) to the stored patterns. While this may be
appropriate in domains in which related items have patterns or codes that are
close to each other, it would be absurd to blindly employ such a simple content-
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addressed memory model in domains where symbols are arbitrarily coded for
storage (which would make hamming distance or a similar proximity measure
useless in recalling the associations that are really of interest). Establishing
(possibly context-sensitive) associations between otherwise arbitrary symbol
structures based on their meanings and retrieving such associations eciently
requires complex networks of learned associations more reminiscent of associa-
tive knowledge networks, semantic networks (Quillian, 1968), frames (Minsky,
1975), conceptual structures (Sowa, 1984), schemas (Arbib, 1994), agents (Min-
sky, 1986) and object-oriented programs of SAI (Norvig, 1992) than today's
simple NANN associative memory models. This is not to suggest that such
structures cannot be implemented using suitable NANN building blocks | see
(Arbib, 1994; Dyer, 1994; 1994b; Miikkulainen, 1994a; Bookman, 1994; Barn-
den, 1994a; 1994b) for some examples of such implementations. Indeed, such
NANN implementations of complex symbol structures and symbolic processes
can oer many potential advantages (e.g., robustness, parallelism) for SAI.
4.10 Distributed Storage, Processing, and
Control
Distributed storage, processing, and control are often claimed to be some of
the major advantages of NANN systems over their SAI counterparts. It is far
from clear as to what is generally meant by the term distributed when used in
this context (Oden, 1994).
Perhaps it is most natural to think of an item as distributed when it is coded
(say as a pattern vector) whose components by themselves are neither sucient
to identify the item nor have any useful semantic content. Thus, the binary
code for a letter of the alphabet is distributed. Any item thus distributed
eventually has to be reconstructed from the pieces of its code. This form of
distribution may be in space, time, or both. Thus the binary code for a letter of
the alphabet may be transmitted serially (distributed in time) over a single link
that can carry 1 bit of information at a time or in parallel (distributed in space)
using a multi-wire bus. If a system employs such a mechanism for transmission
or storage of data, it also needs decoding mechanisms for reconstructing the
coded item at the time of retrieval. It is easy to see that this is not a dening
property of NANN systems as it is found in even the serial von Neumann
computers. In any event, both NANN as well as SAI systems can use such
distributed coding of symbols. And, as pointed out by Hanson and Burr (1990),
distributed coding in and of itself, oers no representational capabilities that
are not realizable using a non-distributed coding.
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In the context of NANN, the term distributed is often used to refer to storage of
parts of an item in a unit where parts of other items also stored (for example,
by superposition). Thus, each unit participates in storage of multiple items and
each item is distributed over multiple units. (There is something disconcerting
about this particular use of the term distributed in a technical sense: Clearly,
one can invent a new name for whatever it is that a unit stores | e.g., a number
whose binary representation has a `1' in its second place. Does the system cease
to be distributed as a result?). It is not hard to imagine an analogous notion of
distribution in time instead of space but it is also fraught with similar semantic
diculty.
The term distributed when used in the context of parallel and distributed pro-
cessing, generally refers to the decomposition of a computational task into
more or less independent pieces that are executed on dierent processors with
little or no inter-processor communication (Uhr, 1984; 1987; Almasi and Got-
tlieb, 1989). Thus many processors may perform the same computation on
pieces of the data (as in single-instruction-multiple data or SIMD computer
architectures) or each processor may perform a dierent computation on the
same data e.g., computation of various intrinsic properties of an image (as in
multiple-instruction-single-data or MISD computer architectures), or a com-
bination of both (as in multiple-instruction-multiple-data or MIMD computer
architectures). Clearly, both NANN and SAI systems can take advantage of
such parallel and distributed processing. The reader is referred to (Almasi and
Gottlieb, 1989; Uhr, 1984; 1987) for examples.
4.11 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance
Often the term distributed is used more or less synonymously with redundant
and hence fault-tolerant in the NANN literature. This is misleading because
there are many ways to ensure redundancy of representation, processing and
control. One of the simplest involves storing multiple copies of items and/or us-
ing multiple processors to replicate the same computation in parallel, and using
a simple majority vote or more sophisticated statistical evidence combination
processes to pick the result. Redundancy and distributivity are orthogonal
properties of representations. And clearly, SAI as well as NANN systems can
be made redundant and fault-tolerant using the same techniques.
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4.12 Statistical, Fuzzy, or Evidential
Inference
It is often claimed that NANN models provide noise-tolerant and robust infer-
ence because of the probabilistic, fuzzy, or evidential nature of the inference
mechanisms used. This is largely due to combination and weighting of evidence
from multiple sources through the use of numerical weights or probabilities. It
is possible to establish the formal equivalence inference in certain classes of
NANN models with probabilistic or fuzzy rules of reasoning. But fuzzy logic
(Zadeh, 1975; Yager and Zadeh, 1993) operates (as its very name suggests),
with logical (hence symbolic) representations. Probabilistic reasoning is an im-
portant and active area of research in SAI as well (See Pearl, 1988 for details).
Heuristic evaluation functions that are widely used in many SAI systems pro-
vide additional examples of approximate, that is, not strictly truth-preserving
inference in SAI systems. In many SAI systems, the requirements of soundness
and completeness of inference procedures are often sacriced in exchange for
eciency. In such cases, additional mechanisms are used to (after the fact)
verify and if necessary, override the results of inference if they are found to
conict with other evidence.
Much research on human reasoning indicates that people occasionally draw
inferences that are logically unsound (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). This
suggests that although people may be capable of applying sound inference pro-
cedures, they probably take shortcuts when faced with limited computational
or memory resources. Approximate reasoning under uncertainty is clearly an
important tool that both SAI and NANN systems can potentially employ to
eectively make rapid, usually reliable and useful, but occasionally fallible in-
ferences in real time.
4.13 SAI and NANN As Models of
Minds/Brains
Some of the SAI research draws its inspiration from (rather supercial) analo-
gies with the mind and mental phenomena and in turn contributes hypotheses
and models to the study of minds; Similarly, many NANN models draw their
inspiration from (albeit supercial) analogies with the brain and neural phe-
nomena and in turn contribute models that occasionally shed light on some
aspects of brain function (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992).
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It is important to emphasize that neither today's SAI nor today's NANN have
the monopoly on modelling minds and brains. Today's NANN models are
at best, extremely simplied caricatures of biological neural networks (Shep-
herd, 1989; 1990; McKenna, 1994). Biological neurons and microcircuits of
neurons provide computational primitives that are far more powerful than sim-
ple threshold or sigmoids that are used in most NANN models (Uhr, 1994).
Brains display highly structured yet exible organization into regions, layers,
and modules that perform specialized functions (Kuer, Nicholls and Mar-
tin, 1984; Zeki and Shipp, 1988). Such networks may be modelled by highly
structured NANN models that organize the neurons into locally connected, to-
pography preserving layers that are organized in loosely hierarchical fashion
(Uhr, 1986; Honavar and Uhr, 1989a; 1989b; Honavar, 1992). Such structures
appear to organize the networks of the brain in space (in ways that reect the
physics of the environment using networks of analog representations) and time
(through the use of feedback loops with varying amounts of delay, networks of
clocks and osciallators).
The brain appears to perform symbolic, numeric, as well as analog process-
ing. The pulses transmitted by neurons are digital; the membrane voltages are
analog (continuous); The molecular level phenomena that involve closing and
opening of channels appears to be digital; The diuse inuence of neurotrans-
mitters and hormones appear to be both analog and digital.
Changes in learning appear to involve both gradual changes of the sort modeled
by the parameter changing or weight modication algorithms of todays NANN
as well as major structural changes involving the recruitment of neurons and
changes in network topology (Greenough and Bailey, 1988; Honavar, 1989;
1990; Honavar and Uhr, 1989a; 1989b; 1993). In fact, learning by weight
modication alone appears to be inadequate in and of itself to model rapid and
irreversible learning that is observed in many animals.
Also missing frommost NANN models are elaborate control structures and pro-
cesses of the sort found in brains including networks of oscillators that control
timing. Perception, learning and control in brains appear to utilize events at
multiple spatial and temporal scales (Grossberg, 1982). Additional processes
not currently modelled by NANN systems include processes that include net-
works of markers that guide neural development, structures and processes that
carry information that might be used to generate other network structures, and
so on (Honavar and Uhr, 1990).
Clearly, living minds/brains are among the few examples of truly versatile in-
telligent systems that we have today. They are our existence proof that such
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systems are indeed possible. So even those whose primary interests are in
constructing articial intelligence systems can ill aord to ignore the insights
oered by a study of biological intelligence (McKenna, 1994). (This does not
of course mean that such an eort cannot exploit alternative technologies to
accomplish the same functions, perhaps even better than their natural counter-
parts). But it is a misconception to assume that today's NANN model brains
any more than today's SAI programs model minds. In short, the processes of
the minds appear to be far less rigidly structured and far more exible than
today's SAI systems and the brains appear to have a lot more structure, orga-
nization, and control than today's homogeneous networks of simple processing
elements which we call NANN. A rich space of designs that combine aspects of
both within a well-designed architecture for intelligence remains to be explored.
5 INTEGRATION OF SAI AND NANN
It must be clear from the discussion in the previous sections that at least on the
surface it looks like SAI and NANN are each appropriate, and possibly even
necessary for certain problems, and grossly inappropriate, almost impossible,
for others. But of course each can do anything that the other can. The issues
are ones of performance, eciency and elegance (and in cognitive modelling,
perhaps plausibility in terms of the various known constraints between dier-
ent levels | such as psychological, neurobiological, and neurochemical | at
which satisfactory explanations are sought), and not theoretical capabilities as
computational models.
This is a common problem in computing. One computer or programming lan-
guage may be extremely well-suited for some problems but awful for others,
while a second computer or language may be the opposite. This suggests sev-
eral engineering possibilities (Uhr and Honavar, 1994), including:
1. Try to re-formulate and re-code the problem to better t the computer or
language.
2. Use one computer or language for some parts of the process and the other
for others.
3. Build a new computer or language that contains constructs from each, and
use these as appropriate.
4. Try to nd as elegant as possible a set of primitives that underlie both
computers or languages, and use these to build a new system.
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The term hybrid is beginning to be used for systems that in some way try to
combine SAI and NANN. If any of the above is called a hybrid probably all
of the others should also. But usually hybrid refers to systems of type [2] or
[3]. Types [3] and [4] would appear to be better than [2] (although harder to
realize), since they would probably be more ecient and more elegant. Thus
the capabilities of both SAI and NANN should be combined by tearing them
apart to the essential components of their underlying processes and integrat-
ing these as closely as possible. Then the problem should be re-formulated
and re-coded to t this new system as well as possible. This restates a general
principle most people are coming to agree on with respect to the design of multi-
computer networks and parallel and distributed algorithms: the algorithm and
the architecture should be designed to t together as well as possible, giv-
ing algorithm-structured architectures and architecture-structured algorithms
(Uhr, 1984; 1987; Almasi and Gottlieb, 1989).
6 SUMMARY
SAI and NANN each demonstrate at least one way of performing certain tasks
naturally and thus pose the interesting problem for the other of doing something
equivalent perhaps more elegantly, eciently, or robustly than the other. It
should be clear from the discussion above that the integration of SAI and
NANN systems can be benecially explored along several dimensions.
In the short term, hybrid architectures that use NANN and SAI modules to
perform dierent but well-coordinated sets of functions in specic applications
are denitely worth exploring. A partial list of examples of such integra-
tion include: neural network and expert knowledge based systems (Lin and
Hendler, 1994; Shavlik, 1994; Gallant, 1993; Medsker, 1994); systems for lan-
guage processing (Bookman, 1994; Dyer, 1994a; 1994b; Miikkulainen, 1994a;
1994b; Barnden, 1994b; Omlin and Giles, 1994; Smolensky, Legendre, and
Miyata, 1994; Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans, and McClelland, 1994); systems
for visual pattern recognition and spatial reasoning (Honavar and Uhr, 1989a;
1989b; Honavar and Uhr, 1994; Honavar, 1994; Ballard and Brown, 1982; Uhr,
1987; Tanimoto and Klinger, 1980; Wechsler, 1990; Duda and Hart, 1973; Fu,
1982; Miclet, 1982; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994; Kosslyn and Jacobs, 1994;
Mjolsness, 1994); systems for symbolic inference (Sun, 1994a; 1994b; Barnden,
1994b; Smolensky, 1990; Shastri and Ajjanagadde, 1989; Chen and Honavar,
1994); systems for learning (Honavar and Uhr, 1989a; 1989b; 1993; Honavar,
1992; 1994; Shavlik, 1994; Goldfarb and Nigam, 1994; Fu, 1982; Fukunaga,
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1990; Gallant, 1994; Uhr, 1973; Holland, 1975; Booker, Riolo, and Holland,
1994; Lacher and Nguyen, 1994; Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994; Dyer, 1994a).
These eorts oer a number of important insights into the design and perfor-
mance of such hybrid systems for cognitive modelling on the one hand and
engineering intelligent systems for practical applications on the other (see be-
low).
The integration of concepts, constructs, techniques and technologies drawn
from SAI and NANN as well as other closely related paradigms (including sta-
tistical pattern recognition, syntactic pattern recognition, evolutionary com-
putation) oers a rich and potentially very promising design space for explo-
ration by articial intelligence engineers and cognitive theorists. It is becom-
ing increasingly obvious that this space exhibits almost innite variety that
is characteristic of complex systems. In the long-term, a coherent theoretical
framework for analysis and synthesis of such systems has to be developed. In
order to do this, we need to start developing and rening our categorization of
such mutually inter-related systems. One way to approach this task is to seek
categorizations that capture essential underlying principles of the architecture,
alternative implementations of the architecture, and nally alternative or phys-
ical realization of the candidate implementations of such systems relative to our
goals of understanding and engineering intelligence.
Because of the engineering and technological emphasis of articial intelligence,
most research in the area has focused on the development of algorithms for
specic tasks that appear to require intelligence if performed by humans (e.g.,
diagnosis, planning, character recognition). While such eorts provide useful
technological tools in the short term, they appear to have fallen short of pro-
viding much insight into alternative implementations and physical realizations
of architectures for general intelligence.
Most articial intelligence and cognitive science theories of intelligence are pri-
marily about the content of knowledge or types of knowledge for some task of
interest, with minimal commitment on the choice of architecture (or equiva-
lently, the programming language that denes the virtual architecture of the
computer). Perhaps this is because it is tacitly assumed that any such architec-
ture is one that is capable of supporting universal computation and that nothing
else about it is of much interest. Perhaps this is where the dichotomy between
SAI and NANN can help focus our attention on architectural issues. After
all, NANN models do (in most cases) represent architectural commitment(s)
that are dierent from those implicitly assumed by SAI models (e.g., lambda
calculus or production systems). However, it must be emphasized that one ar-
chitectural commitment is not necessarily better than another independent of
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the task for which the architecture is used. Also worth noting is the fact that
the same system may be lend itself to multiple architectural descriptions. Each
such description can potentially add to our understanding of dierent aspects
of the system in important ways. Furthermore, each architectural description
lends itself to multiple implementations; For example, the same architecture
can be implemented using a network of simple processors or simulated by a
program on a conventional serial computer. And each implementation lends
itself to multiple physical realizations.
Living minds/brains oer an existence proof of at least one architecture for
general intelligence. SAI and NANN paradigms together oer a wide range of
architectural choices. Each architectural choice brings with it some obvious
(and some not so obvious) advantages as well as disadvantages in the solu-
tion of specic problems using specic algorithms, given certain performance
demands and design constraints imposed by the available choices of physical
realizations of the architecture. Together, the cross-product of the space of
architectures, algorithms, and physical realizations constitutes a large and in-
teresting space of possible designs for intelligent systems. Examples of systems
resulting from a judicious integration of concepts, constructs, techniques and
technologies drawn from both traditional articial intelligence systems and ar-
ticial neural networks clearly demonstrate the potential benets of exploring
this space. And, perhaps more importantly, the rather severe practical limi-
tations of today's SAI and NANN systems strongly argues for the need for a
systematic exploration of such design space.
This suggests that it might be fruitful to approach the choice of architectures,
implememtations, and their physical realizations using the entire armamen-
tarium of tools drawn from the theory and practice of computer science | in-
cluding the design of programming languages (and hence virtual architectures),
computers, algorithms, and programs. Our primary task is to identify subsets
of Turing-computable functions necessary for general intelligence, an appropri-
ate mix of architectures for supporting specic subsets of these functions, as
well as appropriate realizations of such architectures in physical devices. The
hybrid or integrated SAI-NANN designs explored to date | including those ex-
amined in several recent books on this subject (Honavar and Uhr, 1994a; Sun
and Bookman, 1994; Goonatilake and Khebbal, 1994; Levine and Aparicioiv,
1994) are only suggestive of a much larger space of interesting possibilities. It
is almost certainly premature to pick one architecture over another as the ar-
chitecture of choice for general intelligence (of the sort attributed to humans),
or even eliminate certain architectures from consideration as candidates. Such
choices can be made only after a careful evaluation of possible designs.
28 Chapter 12
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